Britain's integration model is recurrently held up as the epitome of the multiculturalist model in Europe. Moreover, it tends to be presented as though it was intrinsic to British society and had always existed. This is not the case. In reality the model has passed through successive phases of an ongoing evolution and was constructed through the interaction between British society and the ethnic minorities of immigrant origin who settled in Britain after the Second World War. After a brief period of assimilationism, a race relations paradigm was formulated, followed by the establishment of a multicultural policy.
Race, ethnicity and religion: social actors and policies

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Abstract
Britain’s integration model is recurrently held up as the epitome of the multiculturalist model in Europe. Moreover, it tends to be presented as though it was intrinsic to British society and had always existed. This is not the case. In reality the model has passed through successive phases of an ongoing evolution and was constructed through the interaction between British society and the ethnic minorities of immigrant origin who settled in Britain after the Second World War. After a brief period of assimilationism, a race relations paradigm was formulated, followed by the establishment of a multicultural policy. It is often assumed that multicultural policy is a simple continuation of a race relations approach under another name. But this paper argues that this is inaccurate and that each corresponds to distinct policy parameters and to different stages. Moreover, this was not the end of the line. The multiculturalist model has come under a barrage of criticism emanating from various sources and different viewpoints. Nevertheless, this paper maintains that it has not been eliminated but has metamorphosed into a Muslim paradigm. It explores the different stages of integration policies directed at immigrants and how those were constructed. The paradigms were developed through the categorisation of immigrants by majority society and the mobilisation of immigrants as a result of their interaction with British society. The paper draws the contours of each of these stages, examines the fault lines and areas of tension, and explores the underpinnings of the evolution. It argues that policies were forged through and beyond discourses largely by the immigrants themselves. In the main it can be posited that the process started with action that began at local level at the initiative of the immigrants and through immigrants/ethnic minority agency; it subsequently progressed to the national level. This prompted responses and funding programmes from central government. Nonetheless the artisans of those policies in their implementation were the immigrants and local authorities.

Keywords
Islam, multiculturalism, Muslims, race relations

Race, ethnicity and religion : acteurs sociaux et politiques publiques

Résumé
Le modèle d’intégration britannique est le plus souvent cité comme l’archétype du modèle multiculturaliste en Europe. De plus, il est régulièrement présenté comme un paramètre pérenne de la société britannique, intrinsèque à cette dernière. En réalité, le modèle d’intégration britannique est le fruit de l’interaction entre les minorités ethniques d’origine immigrée installées en Grande-Bretagne après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la société britannique, une intégration qui a traversé les phases successives d’une évolution toujours en cours. Après une brève période assimilationniste, un paradigme de relations raciales fondé sur les classes sociales fut introduit auquel a succédé la mise en place d’une politique multiculturaliste. Par la suite, le modèle multiculturaliste a fait l’objet d’une série de critiques émanant de sources variées. Cependant, cet article défend la thèse d’une métamorphose plutôt que celle d’une élimination pure et simple, le multiculturalisme s’étant transformé en un paradigme musulman. Il examine les différentes étapes et les modes d’élaboration de la politique d’intégration s’adressant aux immigrés. Ces politiques se sont formulées à partir de la catégorisation des immigrés par la société environnante et par la mobilisation de ces derniers dans leur interaction avec la société britannique. L’article dresse un tableau de chacune des étapes, examine les lignes de fracture et les zones de tension. Il explore les lignes de force qui en sous-tendent l’évolution. Il souligne que l’action des immigrés a été décisive dans la constitution de ces politiques. Il s’agit d’un processus qui a commencé au niveau local à l’initiative des immigrés par la mise en œuvre de leur capacité d’action, pour ensuite s’étendre à l’échelle nationale. Les programmes de financement considérables qui en ont résulté ont été développés par le gouvernement central mais les artisans de ces politiques et de leur application n’en demeurent pas moins les immigrés et les autorités locales.

Mots-clés
Islam, multiculturalisme, musulmans, relations raciales
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Britain's integration model is recurrently held up as the epitome of the multiculturalist model in Europe. Moreover, it tends to be presented as though it was intrinsic to British society and had always existed. This is not the case. In reality it traversed successive phases of an evolution which is still in the making and was constructed through the interaction between the ethnic minorities of New Commonwealth origin who settled in Britain after the Second World War and British society. After a brief period of assimilationism, a class-based race relations paradigm was formulated, followed by the establishment of a multicultural policy. However, this was not the end of the story.

The multiculturalist model has come under a barrage of criticism emanating from various sources and different viewpoints. This paper argues that it has metamorphosed into a Muslim paradigm. It explores the different stages of integration policies directed at immigrants and maintains that policies were forged through discourses and action largely by the immigrants themselves. In the main it can be posited that the process started with action that began at local level at the initiative of the immigrants and through immigrants/ethnic minority agency. It subsequently progressed to national level. This prompted responses and funding programmes from central government. However, the shape and character of the policy was mostly determined through the implementation of procedures developed by local authorities according to a pattern establishing consultation with immigrants' associations.

The race relations paradigm

Immigrants from the New Commonwealth who arrived in Britain soon after the Second World War were initially incorporated within the framework of what has been called the 'race relations' paradigm after a brief period of assimilationism. This was a distinctive feature of the situation in the United Kingdom. Several components contributed to the construction of this approach.

A central role was played by the disadvantaged position of the immigrants. While they met the needs of an expanding economy and filled the jobs the native population had left vacant, they tended to occupy low wage, precarious and relatively undesirable positions towards the lowest ranks of the labour market. They were also disadvantaged in terms of their access to the benefits of the welfare state (Daniel 1968, Smith 1974, Brown 1984). They settled mainly in industrial towns where their labour was needed and took up residence in the more derelict, inner city areas. It would be no exaggeration to speak of the 'differential social incorporation' of these immigrants who were 'excluded as workers from participation in the normal benefits of the welfare state in such areas as employment, housing and education' (Rex 1988, p. 29-30). However, they enjoyed formal entitlement to the whole gamut of social and political rights since they were British citizens as soon as they took up residence in Britain (by virtue of the 1948 Nationality and Commonwealth Act). This undoubtedly played a major role in boosting the efficacy of their social action.

The existence of racial discrimination in most spheres of society was compounded by increasingly discriminatory immigration laws that in effect constituted an immigration policy operating undeclared on grounds of racial selection. The Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971 increased restrictions on immigrants from the New Commonwealth. From 1968 the principle of 'patriality' was introduced according to which only British passport holders from the Commonwealth who had a parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom were exempted from immigration regulations. As only 'patrials' enjoyed the right of access and abode in Britain this principle clearly discriminated against New Commonwealth subjects and was incorporated into the 1971 Immigration Act, which clearly established immigration controls based on colour/racial distinctions (Miles and Phizacklea 1984). Indeed, New Commonwealth nationals (who were generally not white) such as Indians would clearly find it more difficult to possess a grand-parent born in Britain than Australians or Canadians.

Yet, post-War Britain was the theatre of competing trends. On the one hand, measures introduced to control New Commonwealth immigration were symptomatic of racist undertones among the right in politics. But on the other hand, this was tempered by the general awareness that discrimination based on racial characteristics had been officially disavowed in the wake of the Second World War when the full truth of Nazi atrocities had come to light. Anti-racist and anti-colonialist convictions were held by a number of Labour MPs and a socialist agenda was politically
dominant. In addition the trade union movement had gained strength as a result of the major role trade-unionists played in the war against Nazism and fascism. The dynamic interaction of immigrants with British society determined the settlement process they underwent and the development of policies towards them. The immigrants were not the passive recipients of policies. Quite to the contrary, through their agency they were central motivators of such policies. However, the form and content of their social action developed within the context described above, which provided a ‘situational logic’ (Archer 1995, p. 216).

Policies which dealt with race and discrimination may appear driven from above by central government. The speech given by Roy Jenkins, the Labour Home Secretary, in 1966 is often quoted as the launching pad of a race relations paradigm that subsequently led to multiculturalism (Patterson 1968). In reality those policies were largely motivated by social action emanating from grassroots actors at the local level. Moreover, although this tranche of policies seems to focus purely on race relations, the social action which brought them about was strongly class-based and denounced class-divisions along race lines (Indian Workers Association, IWA, 1976, in Josephides 1992). This is best illustrated by social action, which started in the West-Midlands and thereafter spread, becoming part of a network with other local initiatives in the rest of the country. Immigrant workers constituted the backbone of action in response to a series of events which displayed the growth of racism in Britain: the 1958 riots by white racists against immigrants in Notting Hill (London) and Nottingham (East-Midlands); the emergence of racist discourse in electoral politics during Peter Griffiths’ successful parliamentary by-election campaign in 1964 in the Smethwick constituency (whose supporters coined the slogan ‘if you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour’); the creation of neo-fascist organisations such as the National Socialist Movement in 1962; and the promulgation of racially-based immigration legislation. The immigrants themselves responded promptly by striking alliances with white, left-wing activists. This led to the creation of the Co-ordinating Committee Against Racial Discrimination (CCARD) in Birmingham as early as 1961. CCARD was to attain national significance in its multiple campaigns against immigration legislation and for legislation to outlaw racial discrimination. It was formed by the Indian Workers’ Association (IWA) and the West-Indian Workers’ Association, and then encompassed many more organizations such as the West Indian Standing Conference, the West Indian Gazette, the Pakistani Workers Association, the Methodist Mission, the Movement for Colonial Freedom and the National Council for Civil Liberties. It was thus squarely working-class in orientation. This is well corroborated by a closer look at its two main initiators: Maurice Ludmer, a trade-unionist and prominent English anti-fascist member of the Communist Party and Jagmohan Joshi, the General Secretary of the Indian Workers Association (GB) with clearly identified Marxist-Leninist convictions (Josephides 1991, p. 22).

Immigrants broadly organised to defend their collective interests on the basis of class combined with race while the form and content of their action were influenced by various factors. Objectively their vested interests generally lay with those of the reception society’s working class, despite the racism which the latter sometimes expressed. This happened to coincide with the immigrants’ experience of social action in their societies of origin. The first two groups to arrive were from the West-Indies and India where some had participated in the anti-colonial movement, in trade-unions and in socialist-oriented movements. A good number of Indians even brought with them the experience of organisations such as Communist and Marxist–Leninist parties in the Punjab where the Naxalite movement was influential. In addition, as mentioned above, the post-war British context was informed by a political and ideological environment propitious to the immigrants’ objectives.

Immigrants adopted a dual and combined logic of action. On the one hand West-Indians and Indians took concerted initiatives to fight for trade-union acceptance and recognition on the shop floor through a spate of strikes (Woolfs, 1965/66; Coneygre Foundry, April 1967; Birmid Qualcast, 1974; Banbury Bakery, 1975). And the IWA continued to organize within a trade-union framework despite the latter’s frequent hostility (Duffield 1988). Among IWA leaders it was even argued that immigrants could act as the vanguard of the British working class on account of their extreme exploitation and their experience of struggle (Jouhal 1975).
On the other hand, immigrants mobilised against racist discrimination in the public space through a variety of actions. Under CCARD coordination they acted as ‘guinea pigs’ to test the 1965 law against discrimination, presenting themselves in public establishments in the Midlands that operated a colour bar. Alongside white co-campaigners, immigrants, and in particular the IWA together with the Pakistani Workers Association and the Bangladeshi Workers Association, were involved in the foundation of the Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (CARF, 1975), the Campaign Against Racist Laws (CARL), the All Faith for One Race campaign (AFFOR, 1972, Birmingham), the Asian Resource Centre (Birmingham), and the Anti-Nazi League (ANL, 1977). They took part in numerous mass demonstrations against racism and racist discrimination such as the March for Dignity in 1969, the 1971 anti-immigration bill demonstrations and the 1979 March against State Brutality, and they picketed the National Front meeting in Southall in 1979. As this mode of social action emerged, it became a common framework of action for a good number of immigrants and their children who subsequently joined the ranks of campaigning organisations. During this period, ‘black’ became a political term used for self-identification by anti-racist activists of immigrant origin (Lloyd 1998). Blackness/race became legitimate grounds for mobilisation, for example, through black trade-union sections, black sections in the Labour Party and black women’s groups. However, these remained within the scope of mainstream organisations as separation from white activists was generally not advocated.

The mass mobilisation of the 1960s and 1970s scored noticeable success. On the social plane, after a period of assimilationism, policies were formulated to address the ‘social disadvantage’ and ‘urban deprivation’ of immigrants from the New Commonwealth. For example, section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act, the 1968 Urban Programme and the 1977 Policy for the Inner Cities (Candappa and Joly 1994) were aimed at towns with a minimum of 2% of immigrants from the New Commonwealth who had arrived within ten years (Chan et al. 2008). Although they did not explicitly target ‘racial’ disadvantage, these policies were meant to redress the manifest discrimination and social disadvantage that ‘non-white’ groups suffered, as evidenced by indicators of deprivation well documented by social scientists (Smith 1974, p321). Furthermore, anti-discrimination legislation prohibited racial discrimination in the public space in 1965 and in housing and employment in 1968. It culminated in a wide-ranging Race Relations Act in 1976. The notion of discrimination based on racial distinctions was thus publicly reinforced as it was explicitly enshrined in legislation that prohibited discrimination on ‘racial grounds’, meaning ‘colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origin’ (Race Relations Act 1976, Chapter 74, 2). The 1976 Act also introduced the concept of indirect discrimination and established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), an independent, well-funded institution with extensive prerogatives. Its mission was to combat discrimination, promote equal opportunity and good community relations, monitor the application of the law and propose amendments to it. It was empowered to investigate cases of racial discrimination in firms and government departments, to serve non-discrimination notices which could be legally enforced, to support in court individuals victim of discrimination and to prepare a guide of good practice which assumed legal value in court. In addition, it produced a good number of reports on discrimination in different sectors. The CRE also set up regional offices to work as local units (Layton-Henry 1984).

Social scientists conceptualised all these developments in terms of a ‘race relations’ paradigm. Some set out to demonstrate the overlap between ‘colour’ on the one hand and ‘class’ on the other. This amounted to the claim that issues of power, status and stratification had led those groups to be excluded from access to resources and had relegated them to an ‘underclass’ (Rex and Moore 1967) while others argued that contact and proximity with a budget of £31 Million for ‘envelopes’ (external) and internal modernisation. This covered chimneys, facades, roofs, etc..., as well as the building of indoor toilets and bathrooms. Streets and parks were renovated. A network of ‘caretakers’ was appointed through associations to take care of repairs and maintenance in the target areas.
would in time improve ‘race relations’ (Banton 1967). An extensive literature appeared on this issue. The argument was put forward that the formulation of race relations in Britain resulted from the structural emergent properties of a labour shortage and the cultural emergent property of ideas about race, colour and Britishness (Carter 2000). For a time the race relations paradigm retained scholarly attention despite being challenged (Miles 1989).

**Multiculturalism, ethnic groups and communities**

While the ‘race relations’ and ‘multiculturalist’ paradigms are interrelated they nonetheless represent two different stages. The concept of multiculturalism was based on ethnic groups and communities, which were created on the material basis of immigrant populations’ geographical concentration.

The Thatcher government came to power in 1979 with two key objectives: the implementation of a neo-liberal project based on privatisations that undermined the welfare state; and breaking the back of the working-class movement. As a result, British society underwent qualitative modifications. The dominant political agenda changed so that working-class based action and left-oriented ideology went into retreat. The multiculturalist policy that then developed, which offered a different kind of situational guidance for immigrants, was prompted by three major factors: the riots staged by young people of immigrant origin, the tension between left-leaning local governments and central government, and the regrouping of immigrants on new collective bases. The architects of the policy were ethnic associations and local authorities.

From 1979 Thatcher’s neo-liberal policy radically undermined any potential amelioration of the situation of disadvantaged people of immigrant origin. Moreover, they were the strata worst hit by the contraction of the Welfare State. The areas they occupied displayed a dearth of adequate services. Unemployment became rampant particularly among young people who faced manifest educational disadvantage. The conditions of inner city housing, where immigrants lived, were so dire that they were known as twilight areas. Anti-discrimination legislation had raised hopes among populations of immigrant origin, especially among the youth born and brought up in Britain who felt entitled to equal treatment on a par with their white peers. This did not materialise as the legislation failed to deliver its promises, thus exacerbating growing frustration. Racial harassment and insult by the police were particularly resented by young people of immigrant background. Social mobilisation among immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s had been organised peacefully, but it suddenly took a new form among young people of immigrant origin with the spate of riots in the 1980s that began with Bristol in 1980 and was followed by riots in all the large industrial towns in 1981 and 1985. Although these riots were a spontaneous upsurge, without prior planning or organisation, they conveyed a clear message of anger and frustration from young people against racial and social discrimination.

In April 1980 the Saint-Paul area of Bristol witnessed violent confrontations between the police and young Blacks. In April 1981 a similar occurrence in Brixton (London) led to 200 arrests of young Blacks and the confrontation was repeated in July with enhanced violence. In July of the same year young Indians rioted to a National Front provocation staged in a predominantly Indian area. Violence was also turned against the police who were accused of protecting the National Front by the young Indians. In the Toxteth area of Liverpool a first outburst in early July was replicated at the end of the month and resulted in the death of a passer-by run over by a police car. In Manchester it was the police station which became the target of the rioters. Despite the 1981 inquiry led by Lord Scarman investigating police action and the subjacent causes of the riots the situation failed to improve. In 1985 all the major British cities were again the theatre of renewed violence, the worst instances being those of Handsworth in Birmingham counting 2 deaths and 122 arrests; in Brixton (London) where rioting cost £ 2 Million and included a lady permanently rendered paralysed by a police bullet (which triggered the riots) and the death of a journalist; in Broadwater Farm (London) a police raid in a house caused the death of an older lady victim of a heart attack provoking clashes of untold violence. One policeman died of stab wounds and 233 policemen were hurt. The number of arrests and the amount of damages were phenomenal. All of the riots were triggered by police intervention barring one, which was in any case directly linked to it (Joly 2007).
The riots constituted a wake up call in a country whose self-image was that of a place where ‘civilised’ negotiations took place between civil society and the government so that a compromise was achieved. They triggered the beginning of a policy that was later to be called the British model of multiculturalism and were one significant influence on the government’s decision to make community leaders significant interlocutors and transmission belts for that policy - a reflection of the experience of British Empire administrators who were accustomed to a system of indirect rule in India. The government made available a considerable amount of funding to be awarded and administered by local authorities who enlisted the collaboration of ethnic community associations and their leaders. Social organisations of this kind clearly benefited from the government’s policy. And they were now well-placed to take advantage of their new status as a result of further changes in the processes of immigrant settlement. In the 1970s the ending of new immigration had reinforced chain migration, as only the families -women, children, other relatives- of those already settled in the UK were allowed to enter, thereby allowing the completion of the demographic profile of certain communities of immigrant origin. From the beginning of New Commonwealth immigration, these populations had settled, on the basis of their places of abode in their homelands, in specific neighbourhoods of industrial conurbations. They had begun to build institutions to service their needs such as religious establishments, shops, restaurants. This made it all the more possible for them to opt for a community association model since the purpose of their collective action was not limited to material issues but also included cultural demands.

The British working class was defeated by Margaret Thatcher’s government when the National Union of Miners (NUM), the spearhead of the trade-union movement, lost the miners’ strike in March 1985, leading to the further decline of class based organisation and political ideology. As for people of immigrant origin, the granting of funding on the basis of ethnic identification meant that ethnic community mobilisation had become their best course of strategic action in the defense of their interests, given that they suffered from heightened disadvantage and unemployment. Social movements among people of immigrant origin pursued two main objectives: the improvement of their living conditions and the securing and transmission of their culture.

Prior to the riots immigrants had begun to participate actively in British politics through two main channels: electoral politics and grass-roots associations. A large number voted, joined the Labour Party and began to stand for election, at least at local level. Their strong geographical concentration gave them a higher political clout than might have been expected on the basis of their absolute numbers. They also formed a dense and flourishing network of associations acting as pressure groups that lobbied and negotiated with local institutions and local authorities. The potential access to resources gave a boost to these associations but modified their orientation and the nature of their action.

The dominant mode of organisation which had derived from a class/race approach thereafter stood mostly on ethnic bases (one notable exception was the IWA-GB which refused any government funding). Their capacity of action was further reinforced by explicit stipulations that immigrants should be consulted about the use of earmarked funding attributed to local authorities (Cross, Johnson and Cox 1988). The pressure immigrants and their associations applied in their interaction with local authorities constituted a key vector for the formulation of multiculturalism in Britain. Indeed, although a great deal of funding was released by central government and directed at immigrant populations, according to the pattern already established for the Urban Programmes and Article 11 of the Local Government Act 1966, that funding was to be managed and allocated through local authorities. Thus, it was local authorities that put multicultural policy into effect as they took on its implementation on the ground. In the 1980s they began seriously to address the question of equal opportunities, which had been one of the aims of the 1976 Race Relations Act, but was left unheeded until it was driven home by the riots. Consequently, Urban Programmes for the improvement of the inner city fully came into their own in the 1980s after the riots: in 1988 there were 57 Urban Programme authorities. The other

2. This was rendered necessary by new directives issued in 1990 about the application of Article 11 of the Local Government Act 1966, which had emphasised the need to consult with communities and to provide posts for ethnic minority associations.
important source of funding directed at ethnic minorities was provided under Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966, which underwent considerable changes.

Multicultural policy was thus shaped at local level. It rested on three elements: equal opportunity, anti-racism and the recognition of difference. However, the emphasis placed on each one differed according to the authority concerned, its political leadership and the ethnic minority proportion of its population. The main metropolitan local governments in large industrial towns were under Labour control so that they tended to oppose central government and pursued radically inclined policies pertaining to immigrants. Among these authorities, the anti-racist element of the policy was particularly well-developed. Others placed a greater emphasis on the cultural dimension of the policy. This created a mosaic constructed at local level, which at a later stage came to represent the so-called British model. Local authorities also set up internal structures to deal with the issue, in the shape of race relations and equal opportunity committees or units that, in turn, organized forums bringing together representatives of ethnic communities. In addition, some departments may have had their own equal opportunity or race relations officers to advise on discrimination in housing, social services and education (Candappa and Joly 1994).

**Equal opportunity**

Local authorities are often a major employer in any large industrial city. As a consequence, the question of employment was a central theme on the equal opportunity agenda. Specific policies and initiatives were put in place to redress the imbalance in the representation of ethnic minority staff. For instance, Wolverhampton Council policy states: ‘The Council will also make use of the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976 [...] which allows for initiatives to encourage under-represented groups to apply for posts and for specific training where appropriate’ (Wolverhampton Borough Council 1986, p1). Such measures might include advertising for jobs in the ethnic minority press, stressing competences rather than qualifications in employment criteria, providing in-service training, etc. Monitoring was set up to quantify disparities and redress them. Of Birmingham City Council’s employees, 6.9 per cent were from ethnic minorities in 1988; the Council set a target of reaching 20 per cent by 2000 in order to match the percentage of ethnic minority population in the city. This objective was reached. Furthermore, black and minority ethnic employees accounted for 22.8 per cent of the council’s workforce in 2007/08. Many other local authorities systematically monitored ethnic minority representation in all services and in employment. This made it possible to identify areas of disadvantage and discrimination. This practice became the norm, subsequently adopted not only in public services but also in the private sector.

**The recognition of difference and multicultural policy**

Regarding the recognition of difference, the aim was to meet the specific needs of minorities through services that were culturally adapted. For example, the chair of the Birmingham social services department, Teresa Stewart, interviewed on 12 January 1986, declared that every effort would be made to respond to those needs, quoting the department’s statement, which recognized that Birmingham is ‘a multi-racial, multicultural society whose different communities have their own values, strengths and validity’³. But a multicultural dimension was most strongly in evidence in education. This was related to a central government inquiry headed by Lord Swann who was the chair of the Parliamentary Select Committee that had been entrusted to investigate ‘the achievements and needs of all pupils for education for life in a multi-racial society’⁴. The resulting report, *Education for All*, published in 1985 and known as the Swann Report (Swann 1985), had a major impact on the development of a comprehensive multicultural and anti-racist programme in education largely because it fell to local authorities to put it into practice and actualise its recommendations. For instance, the Birmingham race relations

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³ The Social Services Committee recognised its responsibility to ‘ensure that its services are available to all residents who need them and that they are sensitively offered in a manner appropriate and relevant to the cultural experience of all recipients, within available resources.’ (Social Services Statement, Social Services Committee 6 June 1984). It implied paying attention to basic and also minute aspects of policy such as providing vegetarian meals on wheels in Asian areas on account of their religious requirements, curries for cultural reasons and possibly a delivery person who might speak their language.

unit’s report on race relations issues 1988–89 states that in the department of education ‘the Multicultural Support Unit has over the last year been active in providing support and influencing the policy direction of Multicultural Education’ (Birmingham City Council 1989, in Candappa and Joly 1994, p96). The Education Committee put forward three main objectives:

1. To be aware of racism and the need to counter it and the discriminatory practice which may result.
2. To provide for the particular educational needs of students and the community, having regards to their individual ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical background.
3. To prepare all staff and students for life in a multicultu-ral society, building on the strengths of cultural diversity and mutual tolerance (quoted in Joly 1995, p142).

Substantial human resources were then put in place to advance the realisation of those objectives, which shows how seriously dedicated the local authority was to promoting multiculturalism in education. The Local Education Authority (LEA) augmented its staff with new posts: three advisers in multicultural education, one adviser in bilingualism, three education advisers on ethnic questions, one adviser on multiculturalism in further education. In addition a multicultural resources centre was set up to provide teaching material and to offer the services of 300 teachers, of which the majority were on secondment to schools (City of Birmingham District Council 1986, p9).

Anti-racism
The third element of this multicultural policy focused on anti-racism and involved setting up structures and measures with a view to combating racism in employment and the delivery of services. This focus was particularly significant in local authorities with a strong left-oriented leadership. In Birmingham, anti-racist training took place throughout the local authority alongside a whole gamut of other measures. In Manchester the strategy document of the social service department acknowledged its responsibility for achieving racial equality and eliminating racist practice from all aspects of its work (Manchester City Council 1980).

Multicultural policy fed into ethnic minority group formation. Differences between the groups were construed on the basis of ‘ethnic’ characteristics deriving from their place of origin. The ‘ethnic’ question in the 1991 Census and other monitoring exercises consolidated this trend, categorising people under a variety of labels which remained controversial: Black (including Black Caribbeans, Black African and Black other); South Asian (including Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and so on). It is important to note that these designations did not refer to nationality but to ethnicity and that the collection of data was predicated upon self-identification. This process reinforced the development of communities and community associations since it constituted a gateway to resources available for a number of community activities, such as the teaching of ethnic minority languages, organising activities for women or older people and giving advice on a range of issues (Rex, Joly and Wilpert 1987). Funding, institutions and policies were premised on data about ethnicity and ethnic communities, which resulted in the setting up of specific local authority committees and the devising of policies, as well as consultation mechanisms with ethnic community associations. The terminology referring to these populations was changed from ‘immigrants’ to ‘ethnic minorities’ in official policy documents, the press and in social science publications. From its elaboration on the local level multiculturalism was adopted nationally as the dominant approach.

Scholars and multiculturalism
Multiculturalism became the official policy, and the ethnic minority community paradigm emerged from the conjunction of official policies, the minorities’ own forms of organisation and social science, the minorities constituting a major player. Multiculturalism itself not only became the official doctrine governing ethnic minorities. It was also debated and theorised by social science. For social scientists interested in these minority groups, the ideas of ethnicity and ethnic groups dominated the scene and they focused their studies on ethnic groups, their characteristics and mobilisation. The discussion explored various dimensions of ethnic groups and ethnicity (Joly 2001): primordial versus situational definitions (Barth 1969); ethnic markers and the importance of boundaries (Wallman 1986); the necessity of
interaction with other groups as a sine qua non of ethnic consciousness; the ethnic group as Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft, as a group for itself or in itself; the relationship between categorisation and self-definition (Jenkins 1997); private/public ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation (Rex and Drury 1994); ethnicity as a resource (Saifullah Khan 1977); its relation to integration and the question of transnational communities. Ethnicity and ethnic groups also became a key theme because it was fed by an extensive American literature on this question.

This paradigm had the merit of giving a real place to social actors, the ethnic minorities, who were thus considered not just as passive victims but also as agents mobilising to defend their interests (Rex and Drury 1994). In addition, according to Rex, the structure of the private domain composed of extended families, communities, institutions and religious groups could provide a welcome home and a source of identification for individuals in an impersonal society; ethnic communities fulfilling the function of an intermediary entity between the individual and society comparable to the analysis of associations by Durkheim (Durkheim quoted in Rex 1996, p57). Rex adds that civic culture and abstract public morals enshrined in laws do not imply the disappearance of a moral, a culture and religion which pertain to folk culture. Humans are brought together into communities within which they are socialised into their initial identity. Moreover, Rex’s conceptualisation of multicultural policy necessarily associates the recognition of difference with a strong equal opportunity approach (Rex 1998, pp 139-141). In Rex’s view, the recognition of difference alone could lead to segregation and inequality, a differential incorporation of populations; on the other hand, equal opportunity on its own may lead to authoritarian assimilationism and the marginalisation of populations which do not fall into line.

However, this paradigm also ran the risk of taking ethnicity and ethnic groups as a taken-for-granted reality, both in the realm of social science and in British society itself. It was therefore criticised for reification. The shortcomings of an ethnicity approach have been exposed from a variety of viewpoints (Modood and Werbner 1997; Baumann 1999). Academics submitted multiculturalism to a variety of criticisms using the term ‘corporatist multiculturalism’ (Schierup 1992, Soysal 1994), followed by Møller Okin (1999), Kundnani (2001), Amin (2003), Clark and Drinkwater (2002) and Hudson (2005, 2007). Indeed, multicultural policy displays mitigated achievements. On the positive side it has realised the acceptance of diversity in British society and benefitted certain ethnic minority groups. On the negative side, discrimination has not been eradicated and some populations such as Muslims continue to be disadvantaged and marginalised.

The Muslim paradigm

People whose country of origin was of a Muslim background were initially subsumed under ‘black’ and subsequently ‘Asian’ categories. Institutions and social scientists did not initially identify them per se as Muslims (Joly and Nielsen 1985). The Race Relations Act 1976 does not cover religious discrimination and the 1991 UK Census did not include a question on religion. Muslims first set up networks and institutions following the contours of ethnic/national and theological differences, forming several communities rather than a single Muslim community. Several parallel but interlinked phenomena underpinned policy changes which led to the development of a Muslim paradigm, Muslim agency constituting a key component of it. Three factors played a central role in making it possible and desirable (or at least viable): Muslim mobilisation, world events projecting Islam to the front of the stage and the 7 July 2005 London suicide bombings.

Muslims themselves played a central part in securing their and Islam’s place on the public agenda and in taking concerted action to make a space for themselves in British society (Joly 1995). They differentiated themselves from other Asians when they began to mobilise in the defense of specific Muslim interests. There were roughly 1.6 million Muslims in the UK according to the 2001 Census and around 1,000 officially registered Muslim places of worship, with numerous others based in private homes. A number of Muslim associations were set up, which at first negotiated on the local level. Muslims were keen participants in the Labour Party and local politics, bringing pressure to bear to further their interests with municipalities and public institutions. From
the early 1980s, various Muslim associations came together to press for their needs to be taken into account, with an early focus on education. One of the first successful initiatives took place in Birmingham, where local Muslim associations set aside their theological differences and formed the Muslim Liaison Committee (MLC) to enter into negotiations with the Birmingham Local Education Authority. This led to the ‘Guidelines on meeting the religious and cultural needs of Muslim pupils’ (Joly 1995, p146). The MLC drafted a list of proposals for the LEA. A working party, composed of school inspectors, heads of schools and MLC representatives was set up. The negotiations which began in July 1983 lasted three years and led to the publication of a circular (PDS/99) dated 10 November 1986 which accompanied the Guidelines directed at all heads of schools in Birmingham. This took place within the framework of a multiculturalist policy of which religion was an intrinsic component, given the non-separation of church and state. Indeed religious education and a daily collective prayer were compulsory in all state schools. Islam and a religious agenda supplanted the multicultural approach only at a later stage. From a local level mobilisation progressed to the national plane with two major campaigns against respectively, the 1988 Education Reform Bill and the publication of the Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie.

The 1988 Education Reform Bill stipulated that school assemblies had to adopt an unequivocally Christian character. This was undoubtedly designed to cancel out widespread practices whereby school assemblies made a place for other faiths with the blessing of LEAs. In response to the Bill a National Coordination Group of Muslim organizations acted together with other religious minorities (such as Jews) and lobbied successfully for an amendment that met their religious needs. As a result, a parent could request that his or her child be withdrawn from the daily act of collective worship at school. Furthermore, the Act also required that Local Education Authorities should set up a Standing Advisory Committee on Religious Education (SACRE, which had been pioneered in Birmingham) with the authority to decide that a school could be exempted from providing an act of collective worship ‘wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian character’ were it to be inappropriate because, for example, a sizeable number of pupils were of different faiths. The structure of British society, especially the organic alliance of church and state and the existence of an established church, had thus created a window of opportunity for Muslims to press their claims for sensitivity to be shown to their religion. This was already illustrated in the educational field where the compulsory teaching of religion in schools provided an opening for other faiths.

A second major event was the response to the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988, which generated extensive protest and developed into a national campaign amongst UK Muslims from the Indian subcontinent. Contrary to assumptions attributing the movement to Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Rushdie, it was unequivocally rooted in local action in Britain with large demonstrations taking place months before the Fatwa. Many Muslim organizations took part in the campaign. The Rushdie affair was a turning point. It placed Islam on the public agenda with the main Christian figureheads extending their sympathy together with some Labour MPs such as Roy Hattersley, former deputy leader of the Labour Party.

5. The five LEA representatives included three inspectors of multicultural education and one inspector of religious education. The head teachers corresponded to the various sectors of education (nursery, primary, secondary and further education). MLC delegates were figures from the main branches of Islam in Birmingham – the UK Islamic Mission, Ahl e Hadith and Sufi followers.

6. As acknowledged by Kenneth Baker, the Secretary of State for Education, in a letter dated 20 July 1988 to Gulham Sarwar, the head of the Muslim Educational Trust.

7. Including the Shariah Council, the Imams and Mosques Council, the Muslim Institute (London), the British Muslim Action Front, the Muslim Youth Cultural Society, the Muslim Youth Movement, Ahl e Hadith, the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Defense Council and the Federation of Sunni Mosques.

8. The Archbishop of Canterbury (News Release, 3 March 1989), the Bishop of Birmingham (The Independent, 22 February 1989), the Bishop of York (The Times, 1 March 1989) as well as the Chief Rabbi (The Times, 4 February 1989). The national debate that was generated included an unequivocal intervention by Roy Hattersley, a former Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, who said at the Birmingham Mosque on 2 April 1989, ‘That Muslims are denied equal treatment under the law is a matter of undisputable fact’. An exchange of correspondence took place between Muslim organisations and the Home Office. These events opened a further debate about the Blasphemy Law. It is worth noting that the Blasphemy Law has been abolished by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, coming into effect on 8th July 2008 in England and Wales.
Muslims have definitely made a place for themselves in British society in a process that began at the local level and then graduated to the national stage. In the realm of policies, Muslims made good progress in securing a number of provisions to cater for their needs in public institutions (Joly 1995, Nielsen 1992, Nielsen 1999, Joly and Imtiaz 2002) and these provisions increasingly recognized Islam as a legitimate category (Samad 1997). A number of modifications have been introduced to public life that take Islam into account: it is possible to swear on the Quran (rather than the Bible) in a court of law. Hospitals, prisons and local councils cater for Muslim dietary needs where there is a substantial Muslim population. Hospitals and local health authorities generally include Muslims in their consultative bodies to reflect the composition of local populations. Local authorities have removed some of the obstacles to obtaining planning permission for the creation of new mosques; plots of land have been granted in cemeteries for Muslim burials; and a representative of the Registry Office celebrates marriages in mosques. Local Education Authorities and schools have taken on board many of the Muslim concerns in areas with a substantial Muslim population: assemblies, modesty dress code, halal meat or vegetarian meals, time and place for prayers, allowances for Islamic festivals, and sex education as part of other subjects. Prisons, which have a specific policy on religion and religious discrimination, have appointed about 50 Imams on a par with Christian chaplains and have made provisions for Muslim needs. In the legal domain too Shariah law has been taken into account. For instance, the courts have compelled Muslim husbands to comply with the contract which requires the payment of a ‘dowry’ in case of divorce, according to the Shariah (Shahnaz v. Riswan, 1965; Qureshi v. Qureshi, 1972) (Joly and Imtiaz 2002). Changes in the interpretation of commercial law have also made possible schemes such as the Muslim Mortgage and Islamic-run housing cooperatives; this is necessary because Islam forbids usury. Shariah councils have been acting in terms of personal law.

Muslims engaged with British society in multiple spheres and their religious authorities even recommended this course of action (Joly and Imtiaz 2002). In the political domain, the active involvement of Muslims increased their representation in local government thanks to their engagement and concentration in some electoral constituencies. For example, in Birmingham, following the 2010 local elections, out of a total of 120 councillors, 25 were from ethnic minorities and 16 were Muslim (Birmingham City Council 2010). In 2011 there were 9 Muslim members of parliament, 10 members of the House of Lords and 2 members of the European parliament of Muslim background. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) became a privileged interlocutor with the British government. The role being played by Muslims in British society was instrumental in securing the inclusion of a religious question in the 2001 census and the introduction of policies taking on board specific Muslim needs in public institutions.

**Multiculturalism or a multi-faith approach**

Multiculturalism has held sway for almost two decades. However, in the 21st century it attracted criticisms from various sources initially on the occasion of riots taking place in the North of England, which involved young Muslims. The Home Secretary’s response was to set up a Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion. Two government reports, the Cantle Report and the Denham report, both commissioned in 2001, indicted multiculturalism for those riots (Cantle 2001; Denham 2001). They deplored the community segregation and even the self-segregation which they attributed to Muslim populations in those areas. Instead, they promoted social and community cohesion. Several politicians made declarations reinforcing this view: David Blunkett, quoted in Alan Travis ‘Blunkett in race row over culture tests’ stresses the sense of identity and sense of belonging (The Guardian 10 December 2001)10. Norman Lamont, former Chancellor of the Exchequer (2002) in an article entitled ‘Down with multiculturalism, book-burning and fatwas’ warns against ‘Balkanisation and increasing

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9. A large proportion of the electorate consists of Muslims in some constituencies. According to the 2001 Census, 48.8% of the population in Sparkbrook and Small Heath, Birmingham was Muslim, 39.16% in Bethnal Green and Bow, 37.6% in Bradford West (Joly 2007).

10. ‘It is a two-way street. If we are going to have social cohesion we have got to develop a sense of identity and a sense of belonging’.

Nonetheless, despite declarations to the effect that multicultural policy was on the way out, I argue that it has instead undergone modifications giving it the shape of a Muslim paradigm. Indeed, we shall see that the strategy developed by the government in response to the 2005 London terrorist bombings focused on Muslim communities in a similar manner to the way it responded to the 1980s riots: ethnic minority interlocutors and associations were replaced by Muslim ones. The fact that the 7/7 suicide bombers were homegrown gave a new profile to the Muslim presence and influenced the government’s response. Although the suicide bombings came as a political jolt for the government, they were preceded by...
real changes in the configuration of the Muslim population's participation in Muslim community life and in British society. Young Muslims and in particular young women increasingly seemed to distance themselves from their ethnic markers. Their elders had created religious institutions firmly steeped in ethnic networks and traditions based on their country/region of origin. These institutions were increasingly being ignored or challenged by younger Muslims, who seemed to emphasize a distinction between religion and ethnicity (Jacobson 1997). Islam was becoming an instrument with which they could challenge parents and community leaders (Nielsen 1999, Joly 2007).

Against the backdrop of well-established Muslim associations and mosques, different modes of mobilisation and participation in society were to place young Muslims at the centre of the government responses to terrorism. This applies especially to Muslim women who burst onto the public scene and have been recognised by central and local government as key interlocutors. Paradoxically, it was British intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq which opened the door to the good reputation of the mainstream Muslim community in this country’ (Blair 2005). This combination of stances was to become the basis of policies that followed.

The British government adopted a dual strategy vis-à-vis Islam in 2005: repression (abroad and at home) in parallel with outreach initiatives addressed to Muslims in Britain. Military intervention in Muslim countries was coupled with action against terrorism in Britain. The Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 was reinforced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006, which included about 200 legal provisions designed to curb terrorism such as an extended period of custody without charges to 28 days renewable, the prohibition of the glorification of the commission or preparation towards terrorism or terrorist acts and the introduction of ‘control orders’ on suspects. The control orders have been strongly challenged in the light of the European Convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedom, the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 and the Bill of Rights 1689. These measures have resulted into numerous arrests, police raids in Muslim communities and enhanced hostility towards the Muslim population, translated into verbal abuse and physical aggression. However, at the same time the government was engaged in increasing the interaction with Muslim associations. In Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 5 August 2005 press conference, having waved the stick by saying ‘Let no one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing’ (Blair 2005), he then declared: ‘The Muslim community, I should emphasize, have been and are our partners in this endeavour. Much of the insistence on strong action to weed out extremism is coming most vigorously from Muslims themselves, deeply concerned lest the activities of the fanatical fringe contaminate the good reputation of the mainstream Muslim community in this country’ (Blair 2005). This combination of stances was to become the basis of policies that followed.

The home secretary set up seven working groups involving Muslim representation with a view to improving integration and fighting terrorism. As stated in the overarching report entitled ‘Working together to prevent extremism’, the working groups concentrated on different strands identified through ministerial visits which were conducted immediately following the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005. These covered:

15. Our current project on Muslim women and participation deepens and elaborates on these findings (ESRC, RES-062-23-0380. ‘Women from Muslim Communities and Politics in Britain and France’ Danièle Joly and Khursheed Wadia).
opening dialogue with young people; fighting extremism and radicalisation; supporting community initiatives on a local and regional level; opening dialogue with women; facilitating the training and qualification of imams and supporting the mosques as a resource for the whole community; providing educational services that respond to the needs of Muslim communities; and ensuring the security of communities. In its report the ‘Prevent extremism together’ working groups (Home Office 2005) stressed the importance of measures directed at education ‘to instill a faithful reflection of Islam and its civilization’ across the education system and to ‘improve the achievement and performance of Muslim pupils’ (Home Office 2005). This recommendation is clearly comparable to what was implemented within the multicultural policy as described above, also because funding was provided to attain these goals. In 2005, the Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund made available £5 million to strengthen interfaith work and associations with a faith base. This benefitted many Muslim associations. Moreover, the general plan mooted in response to the 7/7 events seemed to parallel the initiatives which promoted multiculturalism, with an additional focus on women and young people. The Prevent Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (PVEPF or Prevent) has made available substantial resources: 70 councils in the UK were awarded £6 million in 2006 and £45 million between 2008 and 2011. Prevent emphasizes that it is ‘vital that faith leaders and community leaders are involved’ and that Prevent initiatives must be ‘owned by communities and voluntary groups’ (Audit Commission 2008, p. 5). Prevent was to be implemented and managed by local authorities. The way several have implemented it has entailed primarily, although not solely, the funding of a good number of Muslim associations, largely made up of women and youth.

This was the case in Birmingham and Leicester, which have made a point of working with and through the Muslim communities’ social actors. It thus also heightened the potential for Islam to be used as a strategy to obtain resources, in the same way as ethnicity was used previously. However, the Prevent programme remained highly controversial and has given rise to many criticisms. In the first place, it has been accused of turning Muslims into suspect communities because in the same breadth, it addressed the needs of Muslim communities and their role in supplying intelligence information. It also risked a potential backlash from other communities including white ones because it appeared to ‘favour’ Muslims. Furthermore, questions were asked about the fact that it was directed at Muslim extremism and neglected other forms of extremism, such as that emanating from the far right. Finally, it failed to mention the need to tackle deprivation and marginalisation. Although the rhetoric has continued to stress social cohesion (instead of multiculturalism), the ‘new’ approach uncannily resembles the multicultural one, if we simply substitute ‘Muslim’ for ‘ethnic minority’. It also increased the potentiality of Islam and Muslim associations to become conduits for obtaining resources, as ethnic associations had been previously. Markers and contents had moved on but the form had remained the same.

Scholars turned their attention to Islam and some social scientists strongly advocated the need for a separate ‘Muslim’ category in the study of ethnic minority populations. Muslims and Islam became an important area of investigation among scholars of ethnic relations (Modood and Werbner 1997). The prevailing categorisation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities as ethnic groups was at odds with their emerging self-definition as Muslims. Some organisations such as the Muslim Parliament put the case against a race relations or immigration approach on the grounds that they were denied self-definition and had allowed themselves to be defined in terms of ‘colour, race, ethnic or national origin’ because they had been pressurised to conform to the definition put forward in the Race Relations Act 1976 (Mohammed 1992). In their view, it had led to Muslims being divided and omitted as a substantial group. Meanwhile, resources had been directed to ‘black’ or ‘Asian’ needs whereas ‘Muslim needs were ignored’ (Mohammed 1992). Some social scientists have focused their research on the ‘anti-Muslim’ prejudice that led to the coining of a new word, ‘Islamophobia’, arguing that its consequences have been ‘unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities’ (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997, p. 4). Other social scientists start from

16. I have selected below the most relevant recommendations. Cf. Annex 2.
the vantage point of the Muslim population itself. According to Modood, for example, what is important is that a group should be able to define itself on the basis of its ‘mode of being’ as distinct from its ‘mode of oppression’ as it is best equipped to resist oppression by those ‘dimensions of its being from which it derives its greatest collective psychological strength’ (Modood 1992, p. 55). In my view, using a phrase such as ‘mode of being’ could itself be taken as another type of reification; ‘mode of action’ might be more appropriate. Another dimension relates to their own specific branches of Islam and cultural characteristics (Joly 1995) which are predicated on the fact that Muslims in the UK are in the main South Asian Muslims; this was illustrated by their reaction to Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* which was not paralleled among other Muslim populations in Europe (Modood 1990). This seems to refer to their self-definition which itself evolves through the interaction of the group with majority society. This self-definition has proved open to modification, so that it has been possible for the same population to organise itself on an ethnic group basis and subsequently to emphasise its religious, Muslim characteristics. Scholars examined what they posited as the institutionalisation of Islam (Beckford, Joly and Khosrokhavar 2005). Various aspects of radical Islam more recently have generated scholarly interest (McDonald Forthcoming 2012).

**The importance of minority agency in policy making on anti-racism, multiculturalism and ‘multi-faithism’**

The reference to a multicultural model cannot suffice to explain minority integration. It was constructed through the interaction of minorities with British institutions, minority agency playing a major part in this process. The latter still remains today a central component of policy making. The three paradigms identified display overlaps and there are tensions between them, but each corresponds to a different policy period. They follow one another like a palimpsest.

In the race relations paradigm the focus was on anti-racism, antidiscrimination and class-based mobilisation, as well as a black politics that encompassed all disadvantaged ethnic minorities. People of New Commonwealth background were racially categorised and self-identified as a racially disadvantaged section of the working class. Policy focused on race-based immigration controls while comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation was introduced. At the same time inner city social programmes were implemented.

With the multicultural paradigm references to class or underclass were supplanted by those of ethnicity. Multiculturalism and multicultural policy were characterised by categorising settled immigrants as ethnic minorities, while the populations concerned also mobilised on the basis of ethnic markers. This was shored up by a dense network of ethnic associations negotiating with local government. The delivery of the policy was entrusted to local authorities, but with an obligation to consult with ethnic minorities and the devolving of some funding to them. The policy included three main parameters with differentiated emphases according to the municipality involved: anti-discrimination/anti-racism, equal opportunity and the recognition of difference. This paradigm is resolutely distinct and novel when its parameters are compared to those of the previous race relations paradigm, as are the modes of mobilisation and self-identification.

When the Muslim paradigm emerged, Islam began to occupy centre stage, religious markers replaced ethnic markers (whereas the former had previously remained subsumed under the latter): mobilisation was developed on the basis of Islam and Muslim associations coming together, with ethnic differences among Muslims being put aside. Islam gained public recognition and leaders of Muslim associations constituted interlocutors for national and local government. Islam became all but institutionalised in Britain (Beckford, Joly and Khosrokhavar 2005). The modes of delivery of this policy and associated funding, however, followed the same model as had been adopted for multicultural policy: the funds were allocated to local authorities who were made responsible for implementation, which they undertook through funding and tasking local associations.

17. The term New Commonwealth refers to nationals of countries which gained their independence after World War II. Those are generally non-whites unlike the majority of nationals from Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand which formed the older Commonwealth.
But religious markers and religious associations replaced ethnic ones. The markers changed while the form remained.

Despite the widespread view that multicultural policy has been on the way out, I have argued instead that it has undergone modifications. It has been gradually taking the shape of a Muslim paradigm. This process crystallised in the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings. Despite declarations downplaying multiculturalism and emphasising social cohesion and British identity, multicultural policy has not been eliminated but replaced by a kind of multi-faith approach, which accords the lion’s share to Islam. As a testimony to this shift in policy, state-funded faith schools have been recognised for Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. One probably unintended consequence of the salience gained by Muslims and the higher level of recognition and funding they attracted is the potential rivalry that now exists between religious groups.

It seems appropriate at this point to make a brief evaluation of policies which have addressed the question of immigrants/ethnic minorities, particularly where multicultural policy is concerned. Multicultural policy displays mitigated achievements. On the positive side it has realised the acceptance of diversity in British society and benefitted certain ethnic minority groups. On the negative side, discrimination has not been eradicated and some populations continue to be disadvantaged and marginalised. Many voices from the political, non governmental and academic sectors have criticized ‘multiculturalism’, holding it responsible for the riots in the North of England in 2001 and the London bombings in 2005. In my view, the 2001 riots in the North of England have little to do with the failure of multiculturalism per se. These are regions desperately affected by successive recessions. They have been decimated by the closure of the textile industries which sustained them. Unemployment reigns among white and ethnic minority working class and indicators of poverty are the strongest in England.

Young people in particular are marginalised, without work or hope for the future, without meaningful projects, all the more frustrated as equal opportunity policies may have raised their expectations. Moreover, discrimination and the structure of housing have led to geographical segregation, enhanced by educational segregation which municipal policies have strengthened. This is evidenced in several government reports (Clarke Report 2001, p. 49; Cantle Report 2001, p. 23; Denham Report 2001; Ritchie Report 2001, p. 13). I would argue that these constitute the subjacent causes of the riots thereafter triggered by British National Party (BNP) provocations. It is important to mention one additional factor: young Muslims were deprived of a voice. All interaction and negotiation with local authorities and institutions have been monopolised by association leaders who were men from the first generation. This is where I would lay significant blame for multicultural policy as it has been known to function. National and local government have settled into a comfortable situation whereby leaders of association, first generation men who had become a new kind of notables were privileged interlocutors helping to manage communities. They were also instrumental in the delivery of ethnic minority support and votes for the Labour Party. This formula failed to recognise the demographic changes and the aspirations of subgroups such as women and young people. This view is supported by disturbances taking place as early as 1995 in Bradford which revealed the malaise among young Muslims in the face of first-generation community leaders who the former felt were exercising exclusive control over Muslim communities as they recognised negotiating rights with local authorities and access to resources (Burlet and Reid 1998). With regards to 7/7, the issue is more complex but Britain’s intervention in Iraq against the wishes of the majority of its population (white and other) has a great deal to answer for. In any case, the majority of Muslims categorically disavowed terrorist actions and Muslim associations stated so unequivocally.

Nevertheless, although multicultural policy has contributed positively to the settlement of ethnic minorities it is not a panacea designed to redress social inequalities; it does not intend to challenge liberalism and/or a society based on the competition between individuals. It is meant to create a level field of competition independently of people’s racial/ethnic background. In this respect it has scored some success. It has gone some way towards circumscribing discrimination and racism. It has helped to create an ethnic middle-class (although to a differentiated degree depending on the ethnic group
concerned). This in turn has promoted greater acceptance and a better image of those populations. Their visibility in the public space such as the media has become normalised. Multicultural policies have also helped to redress disadvantage and reduce deprivation, for instance through the renovation of inner city neighbourhoods, educational support and funding to associations. Finally, multiculturalism has enabled the acceptance of diverse cultures and religion in British society. Inter alia it has made it possible for Muslims to feel that they can be both Muslim and British. This was evidenced in our research on Muslim women and politics and by a recent Gallup poll (Gallup Co-exist 2009).

On the negative side, marginalisation and poverty in their varied manifestations have subsisted and are hitting some of the ethnic groups particularly acutely. Discrimination has not been eradicated. The implementation of the policy has granted one section of those populations (namely first generation men) the control of their community, to the near exclusion of women and young people. Albeit, it is important to note that critiques of multicultural policy have often isolated one of its dimensions, the part being substituted for the whole: they have focused solely on the ‘cultural’ component to the exclusion of the equal opportunity and anti-discrimination/anti-racism legs of the policy. This has led to the conclusion that the former had a causal relation with ‘segregation’ and even ‘self-segregation’ of communities, one particular cultural marker being indicted as the main culprit, namely Islam. Neither politicians, practitioners or academics have clearly questioned this confusion which has provided ammunition against multicultural policy, seized upon by the government to promote ‘British’ values as though they stood in direct opposition to the values promoted by British Muslims: ‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the main stream.’ (The Guardian, Cameron, 5.2.11).

**Conclusion**

The anti-multiculturalism rhetoric further increased in 2011. The coalition government seemed to be driving the ‘social cohesion’ and ‘Britishness’ agendas more determinedly. Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 speech at a European Summit on Security illustrated this trend (The Guardian 5 February 2011). He conflated the notion of multiculturalism with what I call multifaithism, criticising ‘state multiculturalism’ and indicting Muslim groups who ‘are showered with public money while doing little to combat extremism’ (The Guardian 5 February 2011, p1-2). This constituted a clear sign that multiculturalism, in its new ‘multi-faith’ phase as argued above, had not been abandoned despite the government’s promotion of community/social cohesion. Moreover, it is evident that both among local authorities and the wider public the culture of multiculturalism is well-entrenched and remains influential. Cameron added that his government ‘will no longer fund or share platforms with organisations that, while non-violent, are certainly in some cases part of the problem’. These groups would also be brought under greater scrutiny. He argued that ‘we have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values’. Cameron emphasised the need to be ‘unambiguous and hardnosed about the defense of our liberty’ and signaled the change in policy. This rhetoric has been accompanied by massive cuts in public spending and the dismantling of the Prevent programme, the funding of which, although highly controversial, had sustained the support for Muslim associations among women and youth in particular. Such rhetoric might simply have been shadow boxing, but it may nonetheless lead to a whittling away of the multicultural/multifaith approach and bring about a change of paradigm in what is often inexactely assumed to be a perennial ‘British model’. The most lethal feature of Cameron’s policy might simply be its drastic reduction of funding to all associations, a measure which will disproportionately hit ethnic and Muslims communities.

**Annexes**

**Annex 1. Swann Report**

‘Education for diversity and for social and racial harmony suggests that the richness of cultural variety in Britain, let alone over the world, should be appreciated and utilised in education curricula at all levels. This can only have beneficial effects for all students in widening cultural awareness and in developing sensitivity towards the cultural
identity and practices of various groups.’ (Swann report, p. 317, Chapter 6, paragraph 2.1).

‘The need to identify and seek to challenge racism - both the misunderstandings and stereotypes which encourage its persistence, and its many manifestations which deny equality of access and opportunity to all groups - has however only recently been seen as a task for schools. We believe that education has a central role to play in preparing all pupils for life in today’s multi-racial society, by ensuring that the degree of ignorance which still persists about ethnic minority groups is not allowed to remain uncorrected and that all teachers, pupils and thus the future citizens of this society are much more adequately informed about the range of cultures and lifestyles which are now part of this country.’ (Swann report, p. 319-320, Chapter 6, paragraph 2.3).

‘A crucial element in developing our aim of ‘Education for All’ is therefore to seek to identify and to remove those practices and procedures which work, directly or indirectly, and intentionally or unintentionally, against pupils from any ethnic group, and to promote, through the curriculum, an appreciation and commitment to the principles of equality and justice, on the part of all pupils.’ (Swann report, p. 320 Chapter 6, paragraph 2.3).

‘(g) Only in this way can schools begin to offer anything approaching the equality of opportunity for all pupils which it must be the aspiration of the education system to provide.’ (Swann report, p. 320 Chapter 6, paragraph 2.3).

‘2.4 We believe that such an approach is even more essential in ‘all-white’ areas and schools, and the findings of the study by Mr Matthews and Mr Fallows detailed in the previous chapter illustrate how little progress has yet been made on this front. If youngsters from the ethnic majority community leave school with little if any understanding of the diversity of cultures and lifestyles in Britain today, and with their misunderstandings and ignorance of ethnic minority groups unchallenged or even reinforced, then there is little likelihood of the efforts of multi-racial areas overcoming the climate of racism which we believe exists. Indeed much of the evidence we have received has stressed this view and many of the staff at the multi-racial schools we visited clearly felt that their efforts would be largely in vain, especially in the face of the widespread influence of racism, unless teachers in non multi-racial areas were also prepared to reappraise and where necessary revise their work to reflect a pluralist perspective. As the staff of one multi-racial secondary school put it to us: We recommend that a syllabus recognising the multi-ethnic character of Britain be used in ALL schools, NOT just those with a multi-ethnic population. Ignorance breeds prejudice, especially where there is no opportunity for recognising shared interests.’ (Swann Report, p. 321, Chapter 6, paragraph 2.4).

Annex 2

Recommendations from the Education Working Group

1. To instil a more faithful reflection of Islam and its civilisation across the entire education system, including the National Curriculum, Further Education, Higher Education and lifelong learning.

2. To improve the performance and achievement of Muslim pupils by strengthening a wide range of existing initiatives.

3. The establishment of a British Muslim-led “National Education Research & Foundation Centre” (NERF Centre).

Recommendations from the Engaging with Muslim Women Working Group.

1. Dialogue and communication which entails deepening the relationships between Government institutions and Muslim women.

2. [Building a] National campaign and coalition which entails increasing the visibility of Muslim women and empowering them to become informed and active citizens within society.

3. Strengthening existing organisations and building links which entails consolidating the good work that is already happening, with a view toward supporting and facilitating its development.

Recommendation from the Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions Working Group.

[...]

4. Strengthen the capacity of Muslim voluntary and civic organisations.

5. Support places of worship, including Mosques, to become co-located within community hubs.
Recommendations from the Imams training and accreditation and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community Working Group.

1. A new national advisory body/council of mosques and imams. This Body would be inclusive and representative of the many traditions practiced in the UK, independent and led by the institutions it serves.

Recommendations from the Community Security – including addressing Islamophobia, increasing confidence in policing and tackling extremism Working Group

[...]

Recommendation 4:
The Government must encourage and empower greater Muslim participation in the various reviews of anti-terrorism provisions and implement the recommendations of these reviews in a more transparent manner. The Government must consult widely, and particularly the Muslim community, on any further anti-terrorism provisions.

[...]

Recommendation 7:
Establish a Steering Group at the DfES, chaired by a Minister and including participation from the Muslim community and other experts, to draw up a strategy on combating Islamophobia through education.

[...]

Recommendation 9:
Better resourcing for more meaningful engagement and partnership between the Police and Muslim communities – including capacity building in Muslim communities for such engagement and participation. In terms of resourcing, there needs to be a recognition that the Muslim community can provide intellectual and human resources. However, what it may not always be able to do is provide financial resources and skills. This is where Government agencies could help. A good starting point would be to set up and resource Muslim Safety Forums (MSFs) across the country where there is significant concentration of Muslims.

[...]

Recommendation 12:
Develop 10-12 Muslim ‘beacon centres’ around the UK, at the heart of Muslim geographic concentrations that will serve as model centres for smaller mosques, cultural centres, educational facilities, etc. The centres will also provide direct access for Government to the grass roots dynamics of the Muslim community.

Recommendation 13:
Equality – to eliminate discrimination against Muslims and promote equality of treatment, opportunities and outcomes between British Muslims and other members of society – through measures stated in section above on addressing Islamophobia.

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